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Altering Infamy: Status, Violence,
and Civic Exclusion in Late Antiquity
This paper investigates the application of the legal stigma of infamia (disrepute) in Late
Antiquity. The legal status is used as a lens through which to view the changing systemic,
religious, and social landscapes between the reigns of Diocletian and Justinian, indicating
the various uses and, ultimately, abuses of the status, as well as the marked consequences
of expanding its deﬁnition. The use of the legal status to marginalize religious deviants in
particular is inspected. This analysis reveals that the amendment of infamia to include heretics,
apostates, and pagans signals the use of classical law to deﬁne orthodoxy and to articulate
the anxiety over the pagan-Christian religious transition. The unforeseen consequences of
infamia’s expansion were the abetment of violence in the fourth and ﬁfth centuries. Moreover,
the disqualiﬁcation of religious deviants from serving on curial councils had a noticeable impact
on some municipalities in the later empire, and may have created a loophole with which to avoid
curial service altogether.
In 537 ce, Justinian wrote to the Praetorian Prefect, John the Cappadocian,
concerning Jews, Samaritans, and heretics serving as curials and apparitors.1 The
emperor conceded that while these people were indubitably “detestable men whom
our right and pure faith has not even now enlightened,” they were not exempted
from their civic duties based on their religion. He did, however, maintain that
these religious deviants be stripped of their privilegia, the protective trappings
of public oﬃce, and treated like those who lived in turpitudine.2 The established
This article is based on a paper given at the Shifting Frontiers in Late Antiquity conference at
Pennsylvania State University in June 2011. I owe profuse thanks to the wonderful James Rives
for his vigilant editing, and to Michael Kulikowski for his aid and bibliographical suggestions.
Additional thanks are owed to Carlos Galva˜o-Sobrinho, Kristina Killgrove, Jacob Butera, Alice Rio,
and Andrew Riggsby. All mistakes are my own.
1. Just. Nov. 45.
2. Just. Nov. 45.pr: respuendos homines, quibus nondum hactenus recta et immaculata fides
illuxit. Both the honors and the restrictions on the municipal elite were a source of great concern; the
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privilegia of public oﬃce included protection from ﬂogging, torture, and being
forcibly taken to other provinces.3 This meant that the detestable curials and
apparitors would be both legally and physically vulnerable once their rights were
taken away. Heretics, pagans, and apostates had already received the perpetual
brand of infamia (“disrepute”) in the fourth century; a legal status dating to the
Republic, which deprived individuals of certain rights: bringing a popularis actio
(“popular action”) in court, serving as an assessor, being called as a witness, and
eligibility for civic oﬃce.4 As I will investigate, Justinian’s decision to allow
infames to serve as curials and apparitors signiﬁes a marked alteration in the
civic capabilities of infames between the Republic and the sixth century. The
shift also raises larger questions concerning the deﬁnition of infamia in Late
Antiquity, Roman attitudes towards the body, and the later imposition of curial
munera.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Republic and early empire, legal infamia resulted from certain civil
lawsuits, public criminal trials, or employment in speciﬁc professions.5 Only in
the fourth century ce was the stigma applied to those who did not conform to
religious standards. The amendment of infamia to include these religious de-
viants signals and upholds the well-documented anxiety over the pagan-Christian
religious transition in the legal sources.6 Of particular interest among the schol-
earlier Theodosian Code transmits 192 laws (section 12.1) just governing the duties and privileges of
decurions.
3. Assumedly, Justinian’s note that decurions could not ad aliam deducantur provinciam is
a protection from abduction (cf. Augustine’s allegations that elites were snatched out of North Africa
in Ep. 10*) rather than being sent to the mines. Just. Nov. 45.pr: honore vero fruantur nullo, sed sint
in turpitudine fortunae, in qua et animam volunt esse. Sic igitur eis de hoc dispone. Concerning the
safety of decurions from corporal punishment, see CJ. 2.11.5. Regarding the classiﬁcation of persons
as in turpitudine, Ulpian notes that in the Praetor’s Edict (preserved in the Digest of Justinian), those
who were in turpitudine notabiles (“disgraced persons due to their turpitude”) were in the “second
class” of persons delineated by the edict, i.e., those that could not represent others in legal actions
(Ulp. Dig. 3.1.1.5). This class included any man who corpore suo muliebria passus est (“suﬀered
womanly things with his body”), men condemned on capital charges, and men who were hired as
beast ﬁghters for the arena (ibid. 6).
4. Those found guilty of haeretici dogmatis (“heretical dogmas”) were to sustain infamia,
according to the edict of 380 (CTh. 16.1.2.1=CJ. 1.1.1.1), and elites with any rank found guilty
of heresy and performing sacriﬁces (i.e., acting as a pagan) were given infamia in 391 (CTh. 16.7.5).
Manichaeans were declared to be infames and probrosi in 372 (CTh. 16.5.3), and their infamia was
reiterated in a law of 381 (CTh. 16.5.7). Donatists experienced infamia from 414 (CTh. 16.5.54).
Jews were often associated with pagans, heretics, and apostates and granted like disabilities (CTh.
16.7.3.1 [383]). Caroline Humfress notes the inferred infamia attached to Jews in this law (2008:
138n.35).
5. Crook 1967: 83 argues it was likely applied to all those convicted in criminal trials. The
jurist Macer suggests it could only follow a crime tried in public court (iudicium publicum) and
certain other actiones: robbery, theft, violence, and iniuria (Dig. 48.1.7).
6. Just to name a few: MacMullen 1997; Errington 2006: 171–260; Noethlichs 2006.
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arly approaches to this period is James Rives’ demonstration that Roman laws
on magic shifted from focusing on detrimental actions in the Republic to fo-
cusing on religious deviance in Late Antiquity.7 In this paper, I concentrate on
the expansion of infamia from the fourth to sixth centuries, and argue that—in
a similar mode to laws on magic—laws pertaining to infamia expanded from
moral and social concerns to include religious ones. I use the status as a lens
through which to view the changing systemic, religious, and social landscapes
between the reigns of Diocletian and Justinian, indicating the various uses and,
ultimately, abuses of the status, as well as the marked consequences of expanding
its deﬁnition.
Although numerous scholars have distinguished the changing concepts of
citizenship and status within the later Roman empire, none have fully explored
the shifts in the application of legal infamia or the implications of this expansion.8
While largely overlooked, the legal augmentation of the status’s scope represents
one of the major trends in the later empire, and, as it will be shown, had many
implications both intentional and unintentional. First, in order to delineate the
nature and gravity of the status, a synopsis of the deﬁnition, codiﬁcation, and
disabilities carried by legal infamia is provided.9 While it has been proposed
that the status was detrimental only to the elite and did not play a large part in
the day-to-day lives of disreputable persons, legal and literary evidence in fact
demonstrates that there was a judicial and physical vulnerability connected to
infamia from its beginnings in the Republic that placed infames at a disadvantage
in court and made them susceptible to violence.10
Second, a section will indicate the imperial use of the status in Late Antiquity.
Perhaps harkening back to the example provided by Augustus’s redeﬁnition
of infamia, fourth century emperors used it to communicate the censorial role
of the emperor and to delineate shameful behavior. Moreover, beginning with
Diocletian, infamia began to be used in a novel way: in order to reify religious
beliefs and marginalize religious deviants. By the end of the fourth century, the
deprivation of honor was regularized as the initial step for marginalization. The
use of infamia to proscribe religious sects continued throughout the fourth century,
but would have unforeseen repercussions. A third section then investigates one
7. Rives 2003. Rives notes that magic should be retained as a heuristic category, and claims
that, “it is the only term ﬂuid enough to function as an inclusive rubric for this shifting set of
concerns” (313).
8. For a close reading, see Sherwin-White 1973. For the changes introduced by Caracalla,
see especially: 275–87. For the constitutio Antoniniana and the expansion of citizenship: Wolﬀ
1976. Also note Millar 1983: 76–96 and Garnsey 2004: 133–55. Regarding disrepute: the work
of Humfress 2008: 128–42 has begun to investigate the issues of citizenship and heresy, as does
Lo Nero 2001: 146–64.
9. Only a cursory examination of infamia as it appears to have been applied in the Republic
and Principate is oﬀered in this article. For expansive studies, see Greenidge 1894 and Kaser 1956.
10. For the view of infamia as an elite penalty with little day-to-day eﬀect, see Riggsby 2010:
73–74, Knapp 2011: 280–81.
classical antiquity Volume 33/No. 1 /April 20144
such unintended consequence of marginalizing heretics, pagans, and apostates as
infames: susceptibility to violence. I contend that the lack of legal redress put these
newly outcast infames at corporal risk, and may have contributed to the increase in
violence—especially against heretics—within Late Antique cities. Additionally,
the often ambiguous constructions of heresy and orthodoxy contributed to a new
sense of extra-legal license among the populace, a fact that facilitated the shifting
of judgments from the courtroom to the forum. It will therefore be important to
consider the implications of infamia in explaining the rise in popular violence
from the fourth century onward.11
After investigating the social repercussions of expanding the deﬁnition of
infamia to include religious deviants, a ﬁnal section explores the civic impact. The
status traditionally disqualiﬁed men from serving in key civic positions within
Late Antique cities; however, there was much debate over this policy during
times of economic hardship. The legal evidence between Diocletian and Justinian
points to confusion and reversals over the eligibility of infames for civic oﬃces
and demonstrates that attempts to redraw the socio-legal margins to exclude those
adjudged as heretics, pagans, and apostates aﬀected some cities to a greater degree
than previously thought. Justinian’s reactions in the Novels point to the fact that
laws on infamia may have contributed to the decline in curial councils from
the fourth century onward. Moreover, the purposeful exclusion of infames from
councils that were themselves increasingly viewed as onerous may even have
made deliberate infamia an option for those looking to avoid curial service. All of
these modiﬁcations should ultimately lead us to reconsider whether the perpetual
expansion of acts that incurred the stigma of infamia at an imperial rather than
municipal level may have led to an overall diminution in its force as a socio-legal
instrument.
Before proceeding to the analysis itself, a few points must be made concerning
evidence, deﬁnitions, and methodology. Particularly in regard to the Republic
and early empire, I will rely on legal evidence that is admittedly both deﬁcient
and problematic for the modern historian wishing to evaluate the eﬃcacy and
impact of law in the Roman Mediterranean. It must always be kept in mind
that the Late Antique juridical assemblages of Theodosius and Justinian are
predominantly abbreviations of classical law rather than direct copies, requiring
us to proceed cautiously in any attempt to reconstruct the legal system of the
Republic and early empire fully or accurately. Much of our legal evidence for
Republican practices comes from Christian compilers of the Digest of Justinian
living in the sixth century; men who pored over millions of lines of jurist
texts—often reducing and amending them to please the emperor.12 Among the
imperial jurists themselves there was frequently much confusion, a fact that some
11. For violence in Late Antiquity, see Gaddis 2005; Drake 2006, 2011.
12. Humfress 2005. Humfress notes that Justinian’s law codes put “new wine in old skins”
(161).
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emperors attempted to clarify by ranking which jurists should be adhered to ﬁrst.13
Viewing the Republic and Principate through the later bifocals of imperial legal
compilers is hazardous, but can be supplemented at least in part with literary and
epigraphic evidence that is more contemporary, even if these sources carry their
own caveats.
Attacking someone’s moral ﬁber and calling them an infamis was a liter-
ary trope often employed by elite writers such as Cicero and Tacitus.14 These
instances point to the social impetus behind legal infamia, but they also reveal
the complications of working with literary citations of it. As many have recog-
nized about infamia, the subject itself is extremely complex and hard to deﬁne,
yet signiﬁcant in that it “enshrines very characteristic Roman attitudes.”15 It is
frequently diﬃcult to distinguish between legal infamia and the social idea of
infamia in literary sources. Thus, when someone is accused of infamia or is called
infamis, it must always be determined whether it is a reference to their actual legal
standing or simply an attack on their character. The “moralizing distortion” of
elite authors that convicted persons in the court of public opinion (rather than
citing a legal judgment) means each piece of literary evidence must be considered
individually.16 However, in utilizing the legal evidence, I have generally inter-
preted citation of the term infamia as indicative of legal infamia. Beyond the use
of this evidence to establish who was and was not infamis, the limitations of the
legal evidence in reﬂecting social realities should also be recognized. Although
not a direct illustration of Roman society, these laws can be used eﬀectually in
order to point to attempts at establishing continuity, expressions of imperial will,
and anxieties within Roman society.17
II. THE CONCEPT OF INFAMIA AND ITS DISABILITIES
The legal stigma of infamia harmed one’s existimatio (“reputation”).18 The
degree to which a citizen’s existimatio was diminished was originally indicated in
the Republic with notae (marks) that were placed next to a person’s name on the
13. Cf. CTh. 1.4.1.
14. Cicero enjoyed hurling about the damning language of infamia, especially in courtroom
orations. In his prosecution of Verres alone, he used the term over twenty times. Even in his letters,
he often uses it to portray the degradation of one’s existimatio or denote immoral actions, rather
than outright legal infamia as given by the courts (Ad Att. 4.17.2). Similarly, Tacitus often applies
it to reproachable behavior (Ann. 6.7), even among non-Romans, e.g., when he notes that among
Germanic tribes, those that ﬂee from battle often kill themselves in order to end their infamia (Ger. 6:
multique superstites bellorum infamiam laqueo finierunt).
15. Crook 1967: 83.
16. McGinn 1998: 9.
17. Barnish et al. remark on the use of Roman law codes as sources, concluding: “The overall
picture of government given by the Codes is, then, as much symbolic as practical. . .” (2000: 166).
18. On the juxtaposition of infamia and existimatio, see Greenidge 1894: 1. The jurist Callistra-
tus deﬁned existimatio as “the state of uninjured dignitas approved by law and custom” (existimatio
est dignitatis inlaesae status, legibus ac moribus comprobatus [Call. Dig. 50.13.5.1]).
classical antiquity Volume 33/No. 1 /April 20146
census rolls.19 The censor calculated the civic worth of an individual based on
the degree to which a person upheld Roman mores.20 Literature could also serve
to reassert or reinvent these ideas of existimatio over time, and to establish an
ideological framework with which aristocrats could view themselves and society.21
As such, both law and literature transmitted ideas of existimatio and its antithesis,
infamia, into the later empire; although what constituted each could and did change
over time. The condition of infamia was mediate or immediate: mediate infamia
resulted from conviction in cases deemed actiones famosae, including fraud,
theft, violence, or abuses in partnership or tutelage, while immediate infamia was
attached, ipso iure, to certain unseemly trades. This professional infamia applied
to prostitutes, musicians, theatrical workers, gladiators, and funeral workers. The
status functioned in order to demark incorrect behavior, as a judicial threat to
coerce persons into paying debts or abiding by contracts, and as a disabling tool
that cut oﬀ those deemed morally reprehensible from enjoying the beneﬁts of
being a Roman citizen. These beneﬁts included eligibility for civic oﬃce, certain
judicial rights, and corporal protection.
Exclusion from civic oﬃces was a key element of the disgraceful status, since,
in the Republic and early empire, holding oﬃce was viewed as a mark of prestige
and the principal outlet for honor available to local elites. While ineligibility may
have meant little to an enslaved gladiator or pimp, elite citizens in municipal cities
regarded curial oﬃce as pivotal.22 The acts and professions that received infamia
were enumerated in the Praetor’s Edict, or edictum perpetuum, and together with
imperial pronouncements served as a reference guide to those oﬃcials presiding
over courts in Rome and the provinces.23 The edict instructed them as to who
19. The marks were formally called notae censoriae. See Cic. Pro. Clue. 46.129. Livy notes:
“[the censorship] was invested with the regulation of the mores and discipline of the Romans” (ut
morum disciplinaeque Romanae penes eam regimen [4.8.2]).
20. Dion. Hal. 20.13.3: “But the Romans, throwing open every house and extending the authority
of the censors [τν ρχν τν τιμητν] even to the bed-chamber, made that oﬃce the overseer and
guardian of everything that took place in the homes.” trans. Cary.
21. Habinek 1998: 45–49. Habinek notes that Roman literature, “draws upon and enhances
other forms of social authority” (ibid. 3).
22. Evidence for the exclusion of disreputable persons from municipal oﬃce is provided by
the tabula Heracleensis, a bronze tablet erected in the Italian town of Heraclea around 45 bce,
which instituted a legal ban on numerous classes of people holding municipal oﬃces: CIL I2, 593=
Crawford 1996 I: 355–91n.24. Those excluded were persons convicted of theft and other criminal
misdeeds, those who perjured themselves in court, those sentenced to exile, those thrown out of
the military in disgrace, gladiators, prostitutes, pimps, and actors (ibid. l.110–114). The tabula
Heracleensis likely transmits Julius Caesar’s lex Julia municipalis. While a tablet does not directly
characterize these unseemly persons as infames, the Praetor’s Edict indicates that the Roman courts
referred to such individuals as infames.
23. Though technically mutable prior to its codiﬁcation under Hadrian in c. 130, the Praetor’s
Edict changed little from year to year at Rome itself. The jurist Salvius Julianus codiﬁed the praetor’s
edicts for the praetor urbanus, the praetor peregrinus, and some of the aedilitian edicts c. 130, but
appears to have changed them little (Schiller 1978: 432). Enumeration of infames: cf. Dig. 3.2, titled
De his qui notantur infamia. Use in the provinces: Cic. Ad Att. 6.1.15. The praetors essentially
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was able to exercise certain legal rights and who was disabled. These disabilities
in fact helped to deﬁne the social hierarchy of the later empire after Caracalla’s
grant of citizenship to virtually all free male inhabitants in 212 ce. The bequest
changed the dynamics of Roman civitas and resulted in new divisions such that
“the primary distinction in Roman law now was not even between citizen and
noncitizen, but between free and degrees of legal disability.”24 Status was a
determining factor in judicial matters for the duration of the Roman empire; the
level of dignitas or rank held by an individual always determined their treatment
within the courts.
In addition to the ineligibility for municipal oﬃce, the status of infamia
carried numerous legal disabilities. Limited accusatorial rights were given to
those people deemed morally corrupt, infamous persons were prevented from
postulating for others, and were discredited as witnesses.25 The low opinion of
infames as witnesses is pointed to in the opinion of Arcadius Charisius, a jurist
under Diocletian and Constantine who wrote extensively on witnesses and who
recommended that if a legal matter required an arena ﬁghter or a “similar person”
(similem personam)—i.e., an infamis—to give evidence, the testimony should
not be believed without torture—as was the case with the testimony of slaves.26
Suetonius describes the reaction to ignoble witnesses in court, writing that an
equestrian accused of lewd behavior was incensed at having prostitutes called as
witnesses against him.27 The declaration of someone as infamis and the citation in
court that a man’s profession made him either a persona turpis (“sordid person”)
or otherwise disgraced were key considerations in judicial decisions.28 Those men
whose existimatio was tarnished were at a distinct disadvantage by comparison
to those with full civic status when they stood before judges in Rome and in
the provinces; furthermore, defamed persons had fewer means to acquire capital
and little legal recourse when wronged.29 An infamis business person likely often
provided formulae that could be followed by provincial governors. Here Cicero says that in his own
provincial edict he will leave some things γραφον (“unwritten”), but generally follow the praetor’s
edict (ad edicta urbana) at Rome.
24. Mathisen 2006: 1036.
25. In his handbook On the Duties of the Proconsul in the early third century ce, Ulpian advised
proconsuls to consider the reputation (aestimatio, a synonym for existimatio) and status (dignitas) of
an accuser when making decisions (Ulp. Dig. 48.2.16). Likewise, Callistratus suggested that all
judges establish the status of a witness ﬁrst to see if he was competent: “whether his life is honorable
and inculpable, or whether he has been branded with disgrace (‘notatus’) and is liable to censure” (et
an honestae et inculpatae vitae an vero notatus quis et reprehensibilis [Call. Dig. 22.5.3]).
26. Arc. Char. Dig. 22.5.21.2. Admissible testimony from slaves often came from torture (cf.
Cic. Pro Cluen. 63.176).
27. Suet. Claud. 15.4. For the civic disabilities of prostitutes in particular, see McGinn 1998:
21–64. For the rage of the eques, on having prostitutes testify against him, see ibid. 63–64.
28. Garnsey 1970: 231.
29. Paul. Dig. 47.23.4. Gardner has concluded that being an infamis would have had little impact
on the life of most ordinary Roman citizens, but she dismisses these disabilities all too quickly as
having little impact (1993: 154).
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encountered problems he was unable to solve through legal means: a leno (pimp)
whose clients skipped out on their tab at the brothel, or, say, a lanista (gladiatorial
trainer) who had rented his familia (troupe) to a wealthy aedile who would not
honor his contract.30 The status could also signiﬁcantly aﬀect an individual’s
physical treatment.31
A ﬁnal damaging feature of infamia was its association with corporal pun-
ishment. Not only were infames barred from civic oﬃce and legally vulnerable
in court, they were physically at risk both in public and within the courts.32 The
corporal vulnerability experienced by infames was due to the fact that in Ro-
man social relations, reputation operated as a security blanket; control of one’s
body advertised status. As has been previously pointed out, infames and slaves
shared a commonality in that neither could guard their body from assault or be-
ing violated.33 Conversely, the elite were a protected class, both corporally and
legally. This is exempliﬁed in Apuleius’s Metamorphoses, when Fotis warned
Lucius that a group of wealthy youths (factio nobilissimorum iuvenum) roved
the street committing acts of violence and murder with no fear of the Prefect’s
troops.34 Many local customs similarly denote the elevated corporal rights of
citizens. A telling passage in Philo notes that in Alexandria, the scourge used on a
person was determined by status. The lower-status Egyptians received a dam-
aging scourge, whereas Alexandrian citizens were beaten explicitly by a fellow
Alexandrian with a ﬂat blade that was less injurious.35 Certain disreputable acts,
such as adultery, were in fact so damning that they immediately stripped a person
of their corporal protection altogether, and made them more open to physical
retribution. Yet even within the context of retribution for adultery, status was a
consideration. Augustus’s adultery laws established that husbands could only kill
certain kinds of adulterers: pimps, gladiators, condemned criminals, freedmen of
the family, and slaves.36 In other words, a husband could immediately kill already
30. McGinn notes: “A pimp who was a prospective litigant might therefore ﬁnd it inconvenient
to appear before the praetor even in pursuit of a just claim. Any pimp who did dare to make an
appearance oﬀered the magistrate an opportunity to demonstrate ﬁrmness on the issue of where
those without honor stood in his court” (1998: 52).
31. Garnsey 1970. Also note Harries 1999: 141–42; Garnsey later stated: “Citizenship was and
never ceased to be a juridical status, giving access to Roman private law, the law that governed
personal, family, and commercial relations. This remained the case in Late Antiquity, and any
evaluation of the role of Roman citizenship in the late Roman empire has to take cognizance of
this fact” (2004: 138).
32. Cf. Edwards 1997: 73–74; Robinson notes: “To use torture on free men, let alone honestiores,
in civil cases was quite unheard of, although it was used on slaves (and infamous persons such as
gladiators); it is hard to imagine anything more outrageous to the Roman sense of dignity” (2007:
123).
33. Glancy 2002: 27–28.
34. Apul. Met. 2.18.
35. Phil. Flacc. 80. On Egyptians and corporal punishment, see Pearce 2007: 58.
36. Marc. Dig. 48.5.25.
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degraded people at will, while fathers generally reserved the right to kill all kinds
of adulterers.
The link between infamia and corporal punishment is particularly evident
in the opinions of the jurists. As previously cited, torture appears to have been
applied to infames, and corporal punishment itself was often strongly associated
with the penalties assigned to dishonorable acts. In the mid second century ce,
Marcellus noted that an assault with fustes (clubs often wielded by soldiers) alone
did not make someone infamis; a judicial verdict had to precede the beating.37
Although shame inducing, a beating in the streets did not, in fact, transform one
into an instantaneous infamis persona. The link is similarly evident in a rescript
of 238, in which the emperor Gordian states that a nephew should not fear for
the reputation of his uncle who was lashed with a rod, if “a decision carrying
the stain of infamy” was not given prior to the lashing.38 Here there is evidence
that corporal punishment visually advertised a degraded status to the public, even
if a judicial verdict had not been handed down.
The anxiety expressed by the nephew over the status of his uncle can be
understood in light of the Roman belief that any beaten body was a dishonored
body.39 Since the ﬁrst century bce, the lex Porcia protected citizens and, as the
thrashing taken by the apostle Paul most famously exempliﬁes, Roman citizens
were not supposed to be ﬂogged or tortured.40 As expressed in the previously
noted opinion of Arcadius Charisius that gladiators and other disreputable people
only serve as witnesses if subjected to torture ﬁrst, a person devoid of dignitas
did not warrant the physical protection of the citizen. Physical treatment was
correlated with one’s status, and Roman citizens—at least in the Republic and
imperial period—were considered far too digniﬁed to be treated in the same way
as slaves. Together with the civic and legal disabilities, the vulnerabilities that
accompanied a stigma of infamia demonstrate that it was not merely an innocuous
label, but rather had numerous repercussions. As such, shifts in the deﬁnition
of infamia could and did have consequences far beyond simply announcing new
boundaries for shameful behavior.
37. Marc. Dig. 3.2.22.
38. CJ. 2.11.14.
39. Glancy 2002: 124.
40. Cic. Rab. Per. 12; Liv. 10.9.4: Porcia tamen lex sola pro tergo ciuium lata uidetur, quod
graui poena, si quis uerberasset necassetue ciuem Romanum, sanxit (“The Porcian law, however,
appears to have been passed for the protection of the citizens in life and limb alone, for it imposed
grave penalties if any one killed or scourged a Roman citizen”). Paul’s ﬂogging by fustes and, later, a
whipping by a flagellum: Acts 16: 22, 22: 24–25.
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III. IMPERIAL MODIFICATIONS TO INFAMIA IN LATE ANTIQUITY
Oﬃcially or unoﬃcially, emperors often took on the role of censor.41 This
began with Augustus, who adopted the formal title prior to revising the senatorial
lists. The princeps further promoted a return to conventional Roman mores
through his social legislation regarding marriage and adultery. His Julian marriage
laws attempted to safeguard a newly prescribed, inherited elite and to “legislate
shame.”42 In the process, the laws functioned to further segregate infames such as
prostitutes and actresses from respectable society.43 Augustus’s eﬀorts essentially
criminalized adultery, and hearkened back to the Republican tradition that was
infamia in order to legitimize it.44 Furthermore, his social legislation used infamia
in novel ways that perhaps provided a model for his Late Antique successors,
many of whom were similarly interested in social legislation. As it will now be
investigated, in the fourth century, infamia and other notae of disrepute continued
to function as statements and tools. They persisted in advertising the censorial
role of the emperor and demarking shameful behaviors, however, the status could
also be wielded to politically and socially immobilize perceived moral pollutants
within the Roman state.45
From the fourth century, infamia was used in many of the same ways that
it had been in the Republic and early empire; however, its scope widened to
include religious deviants. In his program to renew the traditional religion of
Rome, Diocletian attached an indistinct stigma of disrepute to Manichaeans and
Christians. His attempt to stigmatize, disable, and disband these sects would set
a precedent for the use of infamia against heretical sects, pagans, and apostates
by subsequent Christian emperors. It was Constantine who fully realized the
utility of the status. In much the same manner that Augustus had recognized
infamia as a means of delineating his idealized social hierarchy, Constantine
41. While use of the title fell out of vogue after the emperor Domitian, Roman emperors
continued to operate as one in regard to the senatorial lists and through legislation (Talbert 1984:
27). Note Valerian’s refusal to the emperor Decius to serve as censor, since that was a role only
the emperor could ﬁll (HA. Val. 6).
42. Treggiari 1991: 195. Senatorial status could be inherited for up to three generations
(including the senator himself), even if a family member was not himself a senator. Paul, Dig.
23.2.44.pr. See Talbert 1984: 39. Talbert admits the deﬁnition could be fuzzy.
43. Dio 54.16.1. The lex Julia maritandis ordinibus (18 bce) and the lex Julia de adulteriis
were later followed up by the lex Papia Poppaea (9 ce). They are referred to collectively as the
lex Julia et Papia. For repercussions in terms of informers and land conﬁscations, see Tac. Ann. 3.28.
The legislation wielded infamia as a social boundary line: Senators and their descendants were not to
marry freedwomen, actresses, or the daughters of actresses (Paul, Dig. 23.2.44).
44. Augustus’s severe lex Julia de adulteriis criminalized adultery by banishing the oﬀending
woman, branding her with infamia, and conﬁscating part of her dowry. In regard to men, those that
didn’t report the adultery of their wives were accused of lenocinium, and, as pimps, were thus legally
infamis. Soldiers caught breaking the adultery laws were also considered infames.
45. A key example of the use of disrepute to dissuade shameful behaviors is the senatus
consultum of 19 ce found in Larinum (AE 1978, 145). See Levick 1983: 108–10.
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likewise attempted his own social rectiﬁcation, thereby signaling his potestas by
enacting legislation that regulated the private lives of those within the empire.
The subsequent imperial policies of emperors such as Valentinian and Theodosius
points to the declaration of infamia as the normative ﬁrst step in censuring both
actions and people viewed as corrosive within the state; however, its regularization
and the diﬃculty in discerning many of these new infames made new individuals
vulnerable to attack, excluded increasing numbers from municipal oﬃces essential
to the economic health of the empire, and rendered the status an increasingly
blunt tool.
The expansive inﬂiction of infamia on religious sects stemmed from Diocle-
tian’s course of action against the Manichaeans and the Christians. The Collatio
legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum, a collection of Roman laws likely compiled in
the late fourth century, records a rescript of Diocletian against the Manichaeans,
issued in 302.46 Addressed to the Proconsul of Africa, Julianus, the rescript records
Diocletian’s justiﬁcation of action against the Manichaeans before ultimately re-
voking civic rights. Diocletian asserts that those men with dignitas who had
established “principles of virtue and truth” should be obeyed, and expresses fear
that previously tranquil and loyal communities within the Roman empire would
become infected (inficere) with the Persian superstition of Manichaeism.47 The
target was initially the Manichaean leaders: the known leaders and theologians
within the sect were to be killed and their writings burned, and those followers who
did not repent were to have their property conﬁscated (to be given to the imperial
fiscus) and to receive a capital punishment as well. Public oﬃcials who were
found to be Manichaeans were to have their property conﬁscated and to be sent to
the mines for going over to the infamem sectam (infamous sect).48 It is important
to note that the language of the law does not indicate that Diocletian recognized
all Manichaeans as legally infamis. Although the fate of the Manichaean leaders
and those public oﬃcials who identiﬁed as Manichaean was certainly much worse
than the disabilities traditionally carried by the stigma, the emperor perhaps used
the adjective infamis at this time not in the legal sense, but rather to portray
the otherness of the sect. The socially revered—the honorati, those of dignitas,
and other persons of rank (maiores personae)—are plainly contrasted with the
followers of the new, turpid, and infamous Manichaean sect.49
The sources for Diocletian’s initial edict against the Christians in 303, which
began the “Great Persecution,” are admittedly biased toward Christians; however,
the use of deprivation of honor as an initial step in marginalizing people is evident.
Lactantius reports that Diocletian and Galerius published an edict “depriving
46. Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum 15.3.1–8. Hyamsom 1913: 130–33; Frakes
2011: 191–92, 233–34.
47. Ibid. 15.3.2: dignati sunt, quae bona et vera...
48. Ibid. 15.3.7: Si qui sane etiam honorati aut cuiuslibet dignitatis vel maioris personae adhuc
inauditam et turpem atque per omnia infamem sectam.
49. Diocletian’s critique of Manichaeism as “new” is discussed further in Corcoran 2000: 70.
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the Christians of all honors and dignities,” but then goes on to explain why:
“ordaining also that, without any distinction of honor or degree, they should
be subject to torture, and that every kind of lawsuit should be received against
them.”50 Although Lactantius does not state explicitly that it was infamia that
was attached to Christians, it was certainly tantamount to it. The decree stripped
citizens of corporal and legal rights, and exposed them to attack. Eusebius further
notes that the edict lowered those of rank to τιμοι—the Greek synonym for
infames—and concurs with Lactantius’s assertion of the loss of status for those
of rank and the revocation of their libertas.51 When considering Diocletian’s
edicts, it is essential to view his actions not only as an attempt to shame the
Manichaeans and Christians by depriving them of honor, but also to make them
both physically and legally vulnerable. Without the armor that was citizenship
and rank, these newly minted outcasts were susceptible to physical assault at will,
without legal redress. Although Diocletian knew he could not legally convict every
Manichaean, he opened them up to popular abuses by the deprivation of honor.
This broad application of infamia certainly had parallels in the application of the
status to professions, but Diocletian’s use of the status established a paradigm
for its later use against heretics, apostates, and pagans.
Under Constantine, the invocation of infamia continued to be applied in a
traditional manner: to outcast those perceived as dangers to the state, to delin-
eate social classes, and to “preserve the dignity” of civic oﬃces. An example
of Constantine’s employment of infamia is provided by the Arian controversy in
the early fourth century. Feeling as though his courtly friends and the emperor at
Constantinople had deserted him, the Alexandrian presbyter Arius wrote to Con-
stantine around the year 332–333 ce. Socrates’ ﬁfth century Historia Ecclesiastica
preserves Constantine’s reaction to this letter, which—to the emperor—appeared
to threaten a schism. Socrates claims that in response to the perceived threat, the
emperor wrote a letter to Church bishops and the people. In it, he ordered all
Arians to henceforth be called Porphyrians and the works of Arius to be burned.
He justiﬁed his actions against the bishop by comparing Arius to Porphyry: “Since
Arius has imitated evil and impious persons, it is just that he should undergo the
like τιμα.”52 As was the case with the Christian τιμοι in Eusebius, we cannot be
certain that the stigma of disrepute handed down by Constantine, which Socrates
translates into Greek, is infamia; however, τιμα was used by Greek writers as a
translation of infamia.53 The episode is an early indicator that the orthodox versus
50. Lact. De Mor. Per. 13.1: carerent omni honore ac dignitate, tormentis subiecti essent, ex
quocumque ordine aut gradu venirent, adversus eos omnis actio valeret...
51. Eus. H.E. 8.2.4: κα τοupsilongraveς μν τιμς πειλημμνους τμους.
52. Soc. H.E. 1.9.30: Αρειος δκαι ς στιν τν αupsilonlenisτν κενοις upsilonasperπχειν τιμαν.
53. Dio Cassius (56.25.7) refers to the τιμα attached to persons who fought in the arena—i.e.,
gladiators who, we know from the Praetor’s Edict and the inscription from Larinum (AE 1978, 145),
were oﬃcially infamis. The translation of fama versus infamia into τιμ$ versus τιμα is further seen
in Plutarch’s (Cic. 13.2–3) account of the lex Roscia theatralis of 67 bce. He notes that when the
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non-orthodox began to be couched in terms of a juxtaposition that Romans had
long understood: fama and infamia.
While the deﬁnition of infamia was expanded to apply to new religious groups
under Constantine, the utility of infamia in demarcating the elite endured. A law
of Constantine, issued in July of 336, ruled that certain honorable men—senators,
perfectissimi, those within the ranks of the duumvirate or quinquennaliate in the
municipalities, and those who held the position of ﬂamen or a civil priesthood
of a province—could not legitimize children born from unions with certain
disreputable women.54 This included children produced from unions with a
slave woman, the daughter of a slave woman, a freedwoman, the daughter of
a freedwoman—whether she be a Roman or Latin—an actress, the daughter of
an actress, the keeper of a tavern, the daughter of a tavern keeper, a low and
degraded woman, the daughter of a procurer or a gladiator, or a woman who
sells wares in public. The emperor ruled that the penalty for those honorable men
who attempted such legitimization was that they “suﬀer the brand of infamia and
become foreigners from Roman laws.”55 The law indicates that these unions were
being treated as legitimate; furthermore, in the same way that Augustus used his
social legislation to project his legitimacy and potestas, Constantine’s regulation
of the social sphere was aimed more at a display of domination than an earnest
attempt at “Christianization.”56
Although the emperor Julian may have described Constantine as an “innovator
and disturber of ancient laws,” many modern scholars have pointed out that
Constantine was not a legal revolutionary.57 In many ways, Constantine was a
man of tradition, following in the legal footsteps of the emperors Augustus and
Diocletian in legislating within the social sphere.58 Accordingly, Constantine
appears to have used the traditional language of infamia as an advertisement of
his identiﬁcation with Republican sentiments, an alignment communicated in a
rescript dated to between 313 and 315:
The doors to dignitas will not be open to the infamous (famosi) or to the
disreputable (notati), nor to those who are sullied by crime or turpitude of
life, nor to those whom infamia separates from the gathering of honorable
men.59
praetor Marcus Otho organized the equestrians in the theater “according to honor” (π τιμ%) the
people perceived it as a mark of dishonor (τ$ν τιμαν) to themselves.
54. CTh. 4.6.3. (July 21, 336).
55. Ibid. maculam subire infamiae et peregrinos a Romanis legibus fieri. For an introduction
to Constantine’s use of civil law to modify the social sphere, see Humfress 2006: 205–22.
56. Evans Grubbs 1995: 319.
57. Amm. 21.10.8: novatoris turbatorisque priscarum legum. Cf. Humfress 2006: 208.
58. Nathan 2000: 57. For Constantine’s social legislation, see ibid. 55–73.
59. CJ 12.1.2: Neque famosis et notatis et quos scelus aut vitae turpitudo inquinat et quos
infamia ab honestorum coetu segregat, dignitatis portae patebunt.
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The rescript bears resemblance to the civic exclusion of disreputable people in
Republican laws. Furthermore, it exempliﬁes the range in terms and categories for
those considered disreputable—famosi, notati, those guilty of a crime, those who
led a dishonorable life—all of whom appear to warrant segregation. Constantine’s
exclusion of infames from civic oﬃces was a return to the Republican idea that
infamia excluded one from oﬃce; however, Constantine had no way of knowing
that the population of infames would grow markedly during the course of the
fourth century, as infamia continued to be used to contour orthodoxy.
Following Constantine, the legal status of infamia continued to be an impor-
tant device, particularly in deﬁning orthodox practice. However, in evaluating
the later laws that rendered heretics, apostates, and pagans as infames under Ro-
man law, one must be careful not to view the legislation in a vacuum. Infamia
was still applied to many of the traditional deviants, trades, and criminals, but
was expanded to include new groups. Furthermore, applying infamia to religious
deviants was an increasingly emblematic move, one that hearkened back to the Re-
public and legitimized imperial actions, while simultaneously transforming these
new infames into physically and legally vulnerable individuals. The ﬁrst Christian
edict against Manichaeans, issued by the emperor Valentinian I in 372, had simi-
lar language to Diocletian’s rescript on the sect, but singled out all Manichaeans
caught assembling to be treated “as infames and probrosi.”60 In essence, Valen-
tinian communicated his discontent with the Manichaeans and provided a license
to treat these persons as one would an infamis. It was not until 381 that the
proper “branding” of Manichaeans as infames took place, under Theodosius I.61
All Manichaeans then lacked testation rights, known as the testamenti factio—a
core power of Roman citizenship—and the property bequeathed by a Manichaean
could be conﬁscated by imperial authorities. Whereas the Manichaeans under
Diocletian had been viewed as potential traitors within the Roman state, Samuel
Lieu explains the actions of Theodosius in marginalizing the Manichaeans in
terms of a new construction of treason: “In the mind of Theodosius, Christianity
and citizenship were coterminous and anyone who denied Christ automatically
made himself an outlaw of the Christian Roman society.”62 The harboring of
heretics was further seen as contributing to outlawry, and was punished as such.63
By the late fourth century, the Manichaeans had become a demonized “other”
60. CTh. 16.5.3: ut infamibus atque probrosis a coetu hominum segregatis. The term probrosus/a
is a moralizing adjective, rather than a legal class. It is most often associated with disgraced women,
as when Suetonius reports that feminae probrosae were penalized by the emperor Domitian (Suet.
Dom. 8). It is likely parallel to being a turpis woman, who could also not inherit from a will (Tryph.
Dig. 29.1.41.1).
61. CTh. 16.5.7pr: sub perpetua inustae infamiae nota.
62. Lieu 1992: 147.
63. Samellas notes: “The notion of collective responsibility for any opinions deviating from
orthodoxy, for the harbouring of heretics, was a transference in the ecclesiastical sphere of the legal
philosophy that deemed necessary the imposition of severe penalties on whoever harboured fugitive
slaves, bandits, deserters, and, certainly, heretical bishops” (2010: 358).
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within the empire, and as such, received the traditional signiﬁer of marginality:
infamia.
A signiﬁcant shift in the deﬁnition of infamia occurred with a law of Theodo-
sius I in 380 ce. It was at this juncture that the status was applied not simply
to speciﬁc heretical sects, but to all persons who did not embrace the nomen
of catholic Christianity.64 This would, arguably, apply to apostates, pagans, and
heretics collectively, though successive laws would address pagans as receiving
the brand of infamia.65 Although sects such as the Eunomians received a lesser
diminution in status—they were declared intestabiles, thus revoking their ability
to make a valid will—other sects were declared infamis outright, such as the trou-
blesome Donatists who proliferated in North Africa.66 Bishops such as Ambrose
and Augustine had key parts in driving this legislation and encouraging law to
be used as a means of strengthening Nicene Christianity. By the end of Theo-
dosius’s reign, the procedural “ﬁrst step” in delegitimizing a group had become
their declaration as infames, however, there were wider implications for applying
such severe penalties to broad and ambiguous groups within the empire. Whereas
gladiators, pimps, or actresses were rather conspicuous and accepting of their
status, religious deviants were not always distinguishable, nor did they recognize
the labels of “heretic” or infamis. Moreover, how did one implement such broad
regulations?
A signiﬁcant problem that arose from the legislation directed at religious
deviants was enforcement. It was unclear who was to prosecute these heretics and
how exactly one could identify a Manichaean, Eunomian, Donatist, or any other
“heretic” or “pagan.” No federal prosecutor stood at the ready in order to arraign
these new infames; it was rather the responsibility of private citizens to bring
suit or to undertake vigilante justice—a practice often used to combat brigands
in antiquity.67 As Caroline Humfress demonstrated in regard to the courts, this
“criminalization of heresy” in the fourth and ﬁfth centuries had broad implications:
it constructed an increasingly complex legal sphere within which to navigate and
a new environment rife with new loopholes and arguments for legal experts to
explore.68 The social sphere had become similarly more complex: by the late fourth
century, many communities (in particular those in North Africa, Asia Minor, and
Gaul) had become fractured by religious diﬀerences. This posed a problem since
64. CTh. 16.1.2.1: Hanc legem sequentes christianorum catholicorum nomen iubemus amplecti,
reliquos vero dementes vesanosque iudicantes haeretici dogmatis infamiam sustinere.
65. A law of 391 branded apostates and pagans with perpetual infamia (CTh. 16.7.5).
66. Eunomians: CTh. 16.5.17 (389); Donatists: CTh.16.6.4.1 (405); 16.5.54 (414). In the midst
of the mud slinging over Donatism, Optatus of Milevis (ca. 384) wrote that Felix, the consecrator of
Caecilian, was tried and cleared from every infamia upon his reputation (Opt. Contra Don. 1.27).
Edwards argues for a dating of the work ﬁrmly at 384 or later (1997: xviii).
67. Fuhrmann 2012: 53 notes that most brigand policing was likely done by impromptu civilian
posses. These posses were a common policing technique within the empire, depended on in a state
with very little oversight.
68. Humfress 2008: 140–41.
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the status of infamia was itself a construction that took for granted a universal
sense of honor.69 The expansion of infamia to include religiously deviant groups
was a use of classical law and vocabulary to marginalize new peoples; however,
these new socio-legal margins were largely ineﬀective in discouraging heretical
sects, and the imperial administration was incapable of enforcing the laws to their
full extent.70 An unnoticed repercussion of declaring certain sects infamis was the
issuance of a social license that—along with the sanctions provided by teachings
of the Church—facilitated the growth of religious violence in the fourth and early
ﬁfth centuries.
IV. LEGITIMATING VIOLENCE IN LATE ANTIQUITY
In the Republic and early empire, citizen bodies were protected symbols of
existimatio. Alternately, infamis bodies lacked the privilege of control. Although
violence was always a part of everyday life in the empire, it was particularly
common against infames. Brothels and bars were dodgy areas, and prostitutes
were in constant danger of being raped.71 Gladiators were beaten by one another
for sport and could be physically punished by the lanista who oversaw them.
In regard to entertainers, actors could be publicly beaten at any time up to the
reign of Augustus, who amended the rule to require that magistrates only abuse
actors in the theater during the games.72 Though actors were often slaves, it
does not appear that oﬃcials acted any diﬀerently exacting punishments against
slave actors versus the freeborn entertainers.73 In his defense of a client who
had raped an actress, Cicero even stated that the man acted in accordance with a
well-established tradition at stage shows.74 These cases indicate that the physical
treatment of infames was often commensurate with their position within society.
A distinguishing feature is that even if infames were often treated poorly, Romans
never wished to abolish prostitution or to do away with gladiators or entertainers
completely. The criminalization of heresy and paganism were unique in that these
new infames were often cast as persons who could and should be coerced back
into the fold.
69. Barton 2001: 18.
70. Brown notes that there was a “systemic incompetence” in the imperial administration that
hindered enforcement, but points out that law also depended heavily on local magistrates: “the
imperial government continued to depend, to a very large extent, for its eﬀectiveness, on the
consensus of a widely diﬀused network of local elites” (1995: 38–39).
71. McGinn: 2004: 88–89. Clark notes, “It is unclear how they could have had any legal redress
against rape, unless they could bring a charge of injury” (1993: 29). In Rome, the neighborhood
most associated with violence and vandalism was the Subura, a district where ignoble professionals
and their houses of ill repute proliferated (Liv. 3.13 Cf. Eyben 1993: 19, 104).
72. Suet. Aug. 45.3.
73. Brown 2002: 235n.41.
74. Cic. Planc. 12.30. quodam in scaenicos iure maximeque oppidano.
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Interrogations of the ideologies and stimuli that drove the apparent rise in vio-
lence in Late Antiquity have been especially popular in the last two decades. Since
Ramsay MacMullen inquired as to why theological disputes were so frequently
“brought to the point of bloodshed,” many anthropological, theological, political,
and social reasons have been proposed for the religious aggression in the fourth
through sixth centuries.75 In contributing to this ongoing debate, I will return to
a fundamental question that has previously been addressed but not satisfyingly
answered: “What conditions allow such oppressors to prevail?”76 Investigations
into the many factors that facilitated the turn towards coercion, including Christian
attempts at redeﬁnition, the new ideas of martyrdom in the later fourth century,
and the eﬀect of energetic new converts, are all integral pieces of the puzzle. Yet
another piece to be considered further is whether the legal declaration of heretics,
apostates, and pagans as infames abetted the creation of this popular culture of
violence within some Late Antique cities and served to further legitimize the
violence of oppressors towards those convicted—either in court or in personal
opinion—as religious deviants.
As any police investigator or historian will tell you, motives are a hard thing
to establish. It is undeniably diﬃcult to gauge to what degree the state creation of
a growing population of ambiguous infames with limited legal redress enabled
or contributed to the escalated level of violence in Roman communities from the
fourth century to the reign of Justinian. However, a brief look at Christian views
on the use of force and a reconsideration of public punishments meted out to
both “heretics” and the elite can perhaps help us to understand why individuals
may have felt justiﬁed in acts of violence. First, through an exploration into the
inﬂammatory speech in Augustine, attitudes towards coercion and belief in the
use of law to encourage conversion can be understood. Second, a reconsideration
of the recorded acts against “heretics” as those predicated against infames can
perhaps also help us to better understand popular rationalizations for assaults.
The legal marginalization of heretics, apostates, and pagans reviewed in the last
section did not, themselves, compel Christians to violence, but the recasting
of these people as infames may have served to aﬃrm and legitimize extant
animosities. When these laws are understood in conjunction with the proliferation
of ecclesiastical writings on the legitimate use of force and the visible inﬂiction of
corporal punishment on elites, changes in popular attitudes toward violence and
75. MacMullen 1990: 275. Cf. The overview on Late Antique violence in Drake 2006: 1–14 is
invaluable, and the theological-anthropological explanation of Carlos E. Galvao-Sobrinho in that
volume (321–331) is a novel approach. For the role of violence in defending communal boundaries,
see Sizgorich 2009. Also note Shaw’s recent evaluation of the conﬂict between the Donatist and
Catholic churches in North Africa (2011).
76. Drake 1996: 5; 2011. For the role of martyrdom in understanding violence, see Gaddis’s
remark: “Discourses of martyrdom and persecution formed the symbolic language through which
Christians represented, justiﬁed, or denounced the use of violence” (2005: 70).
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the body come into clearer focus, revealing a milieu wherein physical aggression
could emerge.
The inﬂuential writings of Augustine came to promote the use of force, often
using scripture to justify corporal punishments against heretics.77 In one such
sermon, Augustine cited Luke 14, where Jesus recounted the story of a lord who
bid his servant gather people to enjoy a feast. When the invited did not come
freely, the lord ordered the servant: “Go into the highways and the hedges, and
compel them to come in, that my house may be ﬁlled” (14: 23). The bishop
cited the passage in order to legitimize and defend the persecution of persons
deemed outside the orthodox faith. Frustrated with the Donatists proliferating in
North Africa, he stated (between 411 and 420), that the use of force outside was
necessary, so that freedom could arise once they—i.e., heretics and schismatics—
were inside the fold.78 Augustine proclaimed: “Let them be dragged from the
hedges, wrenched from the thorns.”79 The recalcitrance of the Donatists to these
measures is glimpsed at earlier, when, in a letter to Donatist bishops in 396 or
397, Augustine noted that Donatists did not want to correct their crimes, nor did
they respond to the use of violent tactics meant to coerce them back into the fold
and deliver them from eternal punishments.80 Augustine felt as though he was
doing the heretics a favor by intimidating them back to the true faith; however,
the Donatists were not inclined to agree—either that they were heretics or that
they needed coercing.
Augustine’s manipulation of the Luke parable inverts an old debate in Chris-
tianity concerning the use of force. In an open letter to Scapula, the proconsul of
Africa, written sometime after 212, Tertullian had protested the proconsul’s perse-
cution of Christians and expressed both the necessity for religious freedom and the
ineﬃcacy of using force: “However, it is a fundamental human right and a power
of nature. . . . It is assuredly no part of religio to compel religio.”81 Tertullian’s
reasoning was increasingly silenced in the late fourth and early ﬁfth centuries, par-
ticularly in North Africa, where heresies were widespread.82 As it has already been
shown, the state itself—often inﬂuenced by ecclesiastical leaders—attempted to
coerce people from the pagan and heretical hedges to the orthodox table through
the conventional application of infamia in the fourth century. The result of such
77. Possidius’s Vita Augustini (c. 432) recounts that even during his lifetime, Augustine’s
writings had empire-wide inﬂuence and were translated into Greek(v. Aug. 7, 11). A prime example
is Augustine’s immediate inﬂuence during the Pelagian heresy. He held great sway among the North
African bishops and with the emperor, and was a ferocious letter writer. For his strong inﬂuence
on canon law, see Munier 2003.
78. Aug. Serm. 112.
79. Ibid. 112.8.
80. Aug. Ep. 43.8.21.
81. Tert. Ad Scap. 2.2: Tamen humani iuris et naturalis potestatis est . . . Sed nec religionis
est cogere religionem.
82. Christians did still struggle with these earlier paciﬁst views, but increasingly “pushed them
aside” following Constantine (Swift 1970: 533).
bond: Altering Infamy 19
laws was certainly an increase in lawsuits, accusations, and conﬁscations, but,
when combined with writings such as Augustine’s, a socio-legal warrant comes
increasingly into focus that may have empowered certain persons to commit acts
of aggression.
Physical assaults appear especially directed towards heretics. An episode
from the Life of Mani, a biography of the third century prophet of Manichaeism,
exempliﬁes that assaults against perceived heretics predated the imperial laws
that criminalized their sects. Mani was seized by the hair, beaten, and treated
“as if [he] were a heretic.”83 Mani, like all accused of heresy, did not classify
himself a “heretic.” Moreover, there were not typically clear visual or geographic
delineations of heretics.84 Unlike the prostitutes, actors, and gladiators who
coexisted with the rest of the populace in urban centers, these infames could
lurk anywhere, and Christians were urged to seek them out. Particularly volatile
were the extremist Circumcellions that roved the North African countryside in
Augustine’s time. While some of these zealots were brought to the Episcopal
courts to be tried properly, the laity often dealt with them as robbers, and fought
them oﬀ in displays of vigilante justice.85
The lack of corporal deference for perceived heretics and the increased use
of law as a license for religious violence are frequently evident in accounts
of Late Antique acts of aggression. In the case of Macedonius, the bishop
of Constantinople reinstituted by Constantius, heretics were searched out and
sometimes even branded with a hot iron as infamis. Using an imperial edict as
a warrant, the bishop used monks as a personal militia to carry out persecutions
against orthodox Catholics and Novatians. Socrates Scholasticus claimed that
Macedonius tortured clerics and forced women and children to undergo baptism,
and clearly points to the edict of Constantius as providing license to Macedonius
and his followers.86 Sozomen remarked that many had possessions conﬁscated,
lost the rights of citizenship, and others were even branded on the forehead with
an iron instrument.87 Macedonius’s treatment of some “heretics” was much the
same way as a calumniator or runaway slave was treated in Roman society: with a
brand of infamy on the forehead.
Both Macedonius and the farmers terrorized by Circumcellions are demon-
strative of the fact that many bishops and laypeople often did not wait for
a legal conviction of those they adjudged “heretics,” taking it upon them-
83. Life of Mani, 100 (trans. Gardner and Lieu 2004: 65) = P. Colon. 4780. The Life of Mani was
likely compiled after his death in 270, but the Greek codex was likely not published until the fourth
or early ﬁfth century.
84. Cameron notes, “In Late Antiquity all Christians who asked themselves the question called
themselves orthodox. . . To describe oneself as a heretic is in essence a logical contradiction” (2008:
107).
85. Aug. Ep. 88.9 (406 ce).
86. Soc. Schol. H.E. 2.38.
87. Soz. H.E. 4.2.
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selves to punish the accused within the popular court: the forum.88 In his Di-
alogue on the Life of John Chrysostom, Palladius relates the dispute between
the bishop Theophilus of Alexandria and monks who followed the teachings
of Origen, the so-called “Tall Brothers.”89 Following an Alexandrian synod
held in 400 that convicted the monks as heretics and exiled them from their
monasteries, the brothers traveled from Nitria to Alexandria to hear justiﬁca-
tion for the sentence. Confronting the monks, Theophilus was overcome with
rage, and wrapped a pallium around the neck of one of the Tall brothers, a
monk named Ammonius. Hitting him in the jaw, and giving him a bloody
nose with his ﬁsts, he demanded of the monk “Anathematize Origen, you
heretic!”90 Palladius—a vehement supporter of John Chrysostom—was certainly
demonizing the bishop for acting on his emotions; however, it is necessary to
ask to what degree the bishop Theophilus felt entitled to commit acts of vi-
olence toward these monks.91 In his eyes, he pronounced these men heretics
and ergo infames. As such, their rights against torture and corporal punish-
ment towards citizens were not applicable, exposing the “Tall Brothers” to
physical attack. It should be recognized that an important part of legitimizing
the attack was Theophilus’s public accusation of heresy. Although Roman le-
gal process dictated that a trial should have followed an accusation of heresy,
Theophilus took it upon himself to act as judge and to hand down a sentence upon
the monks.
Literary sources suggest that violence towards “heretics” was not always in
the name of establishing doctrinal supremacy. Often emboldened by imperial
support, some sought conversion, while others simply sought money or fame.
Socrates Scholasticus alleges that in the beginning of the ﬁfth century, Theodosius,
the Bishop of Synada armed clerics so as to root out and extort money from
alleged heretics—using a combination of accusations, coercion, and physical
intimidation to get money.92 In the cases of both Macedonius and Theodosius,
the legal declaration of heretics as infames only added a legal tool to the arsenal
of religious zealots or those out to extort money. Moreover, as Augustine and
Ambrose exemplify, the ﬁght against heresy in the name of the “true faith” was
viewed as praiseworthy. A Lydian epitaph dated to around 378 ce records the
accomplishments of a bishop of Apollonis named Makedonios, who purportedly
followed the lead of the apostles, led an ascetic life, and “took up the ﬁght
88. Humfress notes the expense of bringing persons to court may have also lessened the number
of prosecutions (2007: 31).
89. The “Tall Brothers” were a group of four Egyptian monks: the bishop Dioscorus, Ammonius,
Eusebius, and Euthymius. Theophilus convened an Alexandrian synod in 400 that convicted Isidore
and the Tall Brothers of heresy (Origenism) and extravagant asceticism.
90. Pall. Dial. Vit. 6 (=PG 47.23) trans. Meyer 1985: 44: Α&ρετικ, ναθεμ(τισον )Ωριγνην.
91. For the construction of Theophilus as a “bishop-tyrant” used by Palladius in juxtaposition to
John Chrysostom, see Gaddis 2005: 253.
92. Soc. Schol. H.E. 7.3.
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against all heresy, preserving the true faith of the fathers of the catholic church.”93
The inscription presents the struggle against heretics as a virtuous undertaking,
something that had been proclaimed literarily earlier by the likes of Irenaeus
and Eusebius, but was now even etched on an epitaph. Certainly, the imperial
legislation condemning heretics did not conjure the tension between various
religious sects, but the declaration of these persons as infames did strip many
of protective status and legitimize popular violence in a world increasingly ﬁlled
with public displays of supremacy and physical assault.
In addition to the promotion of force in ecclesiastical writing and the val-
orization of combating heresies, the shift toward religious coercion can perhaps
be seen as part of a more widespread increase in the public display of vio-
lence. The visible use of torture and corporal punishment against the curial
class appears to have been on the rise in the fourth century; a development
that further degraded established honor boundaries and made physical protec-
tion a status symbol.94 Though often taken for granted by local magistrates
in the Republic and early empire, full protection from physical punishment
became increasingly rare.95 Although the Theodosian Code alludes to the in-
creased use of corporal punishment on local elites and the growing exclusiv-
ity of full protection, writers such as Libanius and Synesius provide more in-
sight into the social reality for curials. In the spring of 363, Libanius wrote
a letter to an oﬃcial named Alexander in Tarsus, noting that when a gover-
nor approached, men usually ﬂed to the mountains or endured beatings rather
than pay taxes.96 In 388, he reports that the governor of Syria, Eustathius,
had a curial beaten with a leaden whip. Similarly, Synesius, writing in 411,
noted that the military commander Andronicus of Berenice had come up with
thumb-screws and other torture devices that he used on all levels of society,
even keeping people of status from ﬂeeing the city.97 Ammianus reports that
under Valentinian, there was an order that three decurions from several cities
be executed, whereupon the prefect Florentinus remarked to the emperor that
if there were not three magistrates to round up, they would have to just wait
until there were.98 All this points to the growing acceptance of corporal pun-
93. TAM V, 2.1406: trans. Rapp 2005: 291: +ς δ κα κατ- π(-/σης α.ρσεως 0πλισ(μενος
τν ληθ τν πατρων τς καθολικς κλησας διεσ1σατο <πστιν>. . .
94. Brown remarks, “many notables found themselves treated in the same violent and high
handed manner as were members of the lower classes” (1992: 53). See Jones 1964: 749–50,
1310n.88. Also note De Ste. Croix 1981: 472–73.
95. Constitutions from 349/50 and 359 aﬃrm the protection of curials from corporal injury—
claiming to remove “fear of corporal oﬀence” from the oﬃce—and emphasize the security of the
curial’s dignitas (CTh. 12.1.39). Yet in 376, the emperors decreed that while decurions were exempt
from beatings with cords (fidiculae) and other torture instruments, only the chief (decemprimi)
decurions were exempt from beatings with leaden scourges (plumbata) (CTh. 9.35.2).
96. Bradbury, trans. 2004: no. 97, 135.
97. Syn. Ep. 79.
98. Amm. Marc. 27.7.7.
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ishment and pain as part of day-to-day life, and the increasing avoidance of
curial duties.99
Both the literary and legal evidence illustrate that anxieties over bodily harm
became even more pronounced in the later empire and the use of physical punish-
ment more regularized at all levels. Even within monastic culture, the increased
use of corporal punishment to promote discipline and reverence to God brought
about controversy.100 Indubitably, as displays of violence rose, traditional Ro-
man views of the protected citizen-body were further eroded, and perhaps made
violence more socially acceptable. It had previously been understood that ex-
istimatio was reﬂected in the control of one’s own body, but this was increas-
ingly not the case in the later empire. Though elites were only supposed to
be reprimanded by designated judges and superiors, the traditional inviolabil-
ity of decurions was severely injured by state-imposed corporal punishments.
The elite were more susceptible to public humiliation than ever before, a fact
that—when combined with the economic burdens of curial oﬃce that will now
be examined—may have discouraged many from fulﬁlling their curial duties al-
together. It is this amalgam of bodily threat, excessive economic expectation,
and eroded notions of honor and dishonor that perhaps compelled some elites
to turn to the status of infamia as a shelter rather than the shameful stigma
it once was.
V. CREATING A LOOPHOLE
Economic stress was often concurrent with the religious turmoil in the empire.
It is only within the context of the crisis of the third century and Diocletian’s
expansive economic program, for instance, that we can understand an undated
rescript preserved in the Justinian Code, wherein the Emperors Diocletian and
Maximian wrote to an unknown administrator named Charito outlining the munera
that infamous persons were required to perform:
Although infames personae are allowed no honors which are accustomed
to be imparted on men who bear a good name, nevertheless they are not
exempt from curial or municipal liturgies.101
Indubitably, Diocletian’s rescript is an about-face from the position presented
in the Republican tabula Heracleensis and the imperial opinion of Severus and
Antoninus, which reiterated the belief that a brand of infamia excluded persons
99. Harries 1999: 133.
100. Disciplinary beatings also appear regularized within monastic culture. As Gaddis points
out, the excessive use of force by bishops was similarly controversial (2005: 259–60).
101. CJ. 10.59.1: Infames personae, licet nullis honoribus, qui integrae dignitatis hominibus
deferri solent, uti possunt, curialium tamen vel civilium munerum vacationem non habent.
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from holding the decurionate.102 A possible explanation for this reversal is that
economic hardship caused Diocletian and Maximian to revise the traditional civic
regulations. This would allow disreputable persons to hold positions within local
municipal councils, although they explicitly would not obtain the customary
laudations and honores that a member of the elite with intact dignitas would
expect. It must be considered whether Justinian later returned to Diocletian’s
imposition of curial service on the disreputable out of similar economic necessity.
Certainly the legal evidence indicates that there was much confusion over the
eligibility of infames in the curial councils—both at the local and the imperial
levels—which perhaps stiﬂed Justinian’s eﬀorts to halt curial exemptions, created
a loophole for infames (a status which now included heretics, apostates, and
pagans), and paved an unrecognized “escape route” for persons hoping to avoid
curial duties.
In the previously explored Constantinian rescript of 313/315, the emperor
reinstituted the ban repealed by Diocletian that barred infames from serving as
decurions. Although the curial councils are not mentioned directly in Constan-
tine’s rescript, the idea that infames should be outcast and segregated from all
honorable men—as if a quarantined contagion—is patent. Under Constantine,
there was still an association of honor with the curial councils, even if the burdens
of oﬃce were increasingly avoided through new routes. Although Constantine
wished to restore honor to the decurionate, in 380, the issue of staﬃng the cu-
rial councils became further complicated by the declaration of all pagans and
heretics as infames.103 The law now made thousands technically ineligible for cu-
rial service and open to prosecution. Moreover, while accusations of heresy could
certainly proﬁt the imperial fiscus initially in terms of income and new properties,
it was detrimental to the city council in the long term, in that it disqualiﬁed
elites (now poor anyway) from serving the central nervous system of the city: the
curial council.
As the central government strengthened in the later fourth century, there
followed a decline in the institution of the decurionate in terms of its prestige, the
inﬂuence it wielded, and, as we have seen, the corporal protection it aﬀorded its
members.104 Intensive studies of the phenomenon often point to its transformation
from honor to burden between the Republic and later empire, but it should
be noted that not all cities were themselves in a state of decline between the
fourth and sixth centuries, many simply experienced decay within their municipal
102. Rescript of Severus and Antoninus: CJ. 2.11.3. The emperors noted that there were sentences
of both perpetual and temporary infamy, and thus, in the case of temporary infamia, an elite could
once again serve as a decurion after his sentence of infamia had expired.
103. CTh. 16.1.2.1=CJ. 1.1.1.1.
104. See especially Banaji 2001. Banaji expounds on the decline in landowners in local councils
in the East and the shift toward a new imperial bureaucracy (115–17). Also note Lenski 2002:
274–76.
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administration.105 Since the Republic, decurions had served as important economic
benefactors to the municipal fiscus; through their services to the city—and later
their entry fees—these men helped to support their towns.106 However, a pivotal
problem was that as the position became more economically burdensome, the
elite increasingly avoided curial oﬃces by several means, including appointments
within the Church, exemption through military service, service in the senate, and
through posts in the imperial administration.107 These alternate routes to prestige
compounded the problem at the municipal level, forcing many emperors to limit
exemptions and impose curial service more stringently. The status symbol was
no longer service, but rather exemption.
As the council decreased in its ability to confer prestige or, as we have seen,
even provide corporal protection (except to a select few principes), emperors
may have begun to view it as a means of punishing religious deviants while
keeping the councils aﬂoat. A rescript of Theodosius II from 438 attempted
to stop heretics from avoiding curial duties and expressed that immunity was
a privilege that heretics could not attain.108 This is not to say that Theodosius
II condoned heresy—as Book 16 of the Theodosian Code indicates, this is far
from the case—but rather demonstrates that the emperor himself recognized that
the military and imperial administration did not have the means or the might to
drive out every heretic. It may also be evidence that some were already persons
attempting to use heretical status as a means of avoiding their curial duties.
Declaring one’s self a heretic and thus an infamis persona could, as we
have seen, have dire repercussions legally and in terms of corporal protection;
however, there is evidence that elites began to use the loophole provided in order
to avoid the increasingly taxing and sometimes dangerous duties placed on the
curial orders in Late Antique cities. In much the same way, at least one woman had
previously used a loophole within Augustus’s lex Julia de adulteriis by declaring
herself a prostitute.109 At that time, a senatorial woman named Vistilia notoriously
exploited the allowance by registering as a prostitute (thereby becoming infamis)
so as to avoid prosecution as an adulteress.110 Though Vistilia signiﬁes an anomaly
rather the norm in regard to reactions to the marriage laws, her case should here
105. Jones 1964: 757–63. For a comprehensive examination of the role and laws that governed
decurions, see Langhammer 1973.
106. For the development of the summa honoraria in reaction to economic pressures in the second
century ce, see Garnsey 1971.
107. Cameron 1998: 324; Garnsey 1998: 3. The curiales were essentially converted into publicans
in a sense; men responsible for raising the land tax for the empire. The position also became
hereditary.
108. CJ. 1.5.7.
109. The judicial interpretations of Augustus’s adultery law were extensive: Ulp. Dig. 48.5.1–45.
Cf. Ulp. Dig. 48.5.14 and the mention of the loophole in CTh. 9.7.1 (326).
110. Tac. Ann. 2.85. Though it may have been only Vistilia, Suetonius supports the incidence of
matrons who registered as prostitutes in order to evade the adultery laws (Suet. Tib. 35.2). In 19 ce, a
senatus consultum reacted to Vistilia’s case and tried to ensure that such cases of elite prostitution
would not be tolerated.
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serve as an example that infamia could be viewed an alternative. Certainly those
that attempted to use the loophole realized that the stigma was not permanent.
As Humfress has crucially pointed out, conversion could suspend legal penalties
(a fact exempliﬁed by abjuration testaments from Lydia dated to between 428 and
431).111 As such, it must be at least considered whether purposeful ignominy was
simply a temporary status change that could then be recanted if necessary.
Recognizing the continued collapse of the curial council, Justinian would also
embark on a program to revivify them. His concern over the decaying state of
municipal councils was already evident in his response to John the Cappadocian
preserved in another Novel, this one from 535—two years before the letter to
John concerning Jews, Samaritans, and heretics.112 Attempting to bind those born
into the curial order to serve as decurions, the emperor noted that the more he
worked to commit these men to their duty, however, “the more the curials plotted
every trick with which they evaded our just and right enactments and against
the interest of the fiscus.”113 He further claimed that, in order to avoid the new
property regulations that gave the city council a quarter of a curial’s property at
death, curials began to sell oﬀ their property and engage in unlawful marriages
that produced non-heirs—preferring to die in poverty without legal children to
inherit their property than serve on the local council.
Justinian’s response to the petition in 537 ce that began this article—in
which he imposed curial duties on Jews, Samaritans, and heretics—came amid
these concerns over the municipal councils, but also during a time of extreme
ﬂux in the Roman Mediterranean as a whole. The Roman empire of Justinian
was markedly smaller than that of Constantine, and one in which heterodox
groups were omnipresent.114 It had been only three years since Justinian, with
Belisarius’s help, had reconquered North Africa, an area that had been ruled
over by the Arian Vandals. Other parts of the Latin West, such as Ostrogothic
Italy, also had strong Arian contingencies. In the East, other convicted heresies,
such as Montanism, persisted as well. While Justinian still attacked heretics and
Jews with damning legislation, he perhaps recognized—like Theodosius II—that
heresy was a diﬃcult thing to extirpate completely. Moreover, it would take time to
convert the newly conquered territories. Torn between promoting orthodoxy and
keeping municipalities economically viable, Justinian here accepted the existence
of heretics in some curial councils. He would simply justify his decision to allow
111. Humfress 2007: 252. Concerning the conversions of these Lydian “heretics,” see Millar
2004.
112. Just. Nov. 38.
113. Just. Nov. 38.1: tantum omnem adinvenerunt curiales artem adversus ea quae recte iusteque
sancita sunt et contra fiscum.
114. Upon his accession in 527, Justinian’s empire included the Balkan area north of the Danube,
Asia Minor, Egypt, Palestine, Northern Mesopotamia, and Syria. In 534 Justinian had wrested North
Africa from the Arian Vandals, but in 537, he was only at the beginning of a twenty-year war to
take back Italy from the Ostrogoths. For heretical sects in the empire, see Procopius’s notes on
the prevalence of heterodox sects and Justinian’s bloody attempts to combat them (Hist. Arc. 11.14).
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religious deviants to serve as curials by revoking privilegia and casting it as a
penalty. His decision only further indicates that curial councils were no longer
the outlets of prestige they had been in the Republic and early empire, and thus the
exclusion of religious deviants from them no longer served its intended purpose of
representing the existimatio of a community. As it has been shown, Constantine’s
reversal of Diocletian’s ruling that infames could serve in the curial councils had
a greater impact on the health of the decurionate than previously understood. It
was further damaged following the declaration of heretics, apostates, and pagans
as infames. Justinian’s writings reveal the continued complications of declaring
religious deviants infamis, and demonstrate that they were at once outcasts and
necessities to the economic functioning of the Late Antique city. In the sixth
century, the stigma of infamia was neither as cohesive nor as clearly deﬁned as
it had once been, but then again, neither was the empire.
VI. CONCLUSION
By the late fourth century, and certainly by the ﬁfth, the legal use of infamia
had a broader scope than ever before. Priests who bought an oﬃce were branded
with infamy, as were judges who took bribes, persons who usurped honors,
illegal professors, and those who asked for an imperial rescript to overturn their
sentences, just to name a few.115 As we have seen, legal infamia continued to
be used in a traditional manner in many respects, but was not as uniﬁed as it
had been in the Republic, when it had been galvanized by a more collective
social notion of infamia. The status remained an imperial tool with which
to censure improper behavior, to marginalize those deemed moral and social
pollutants, and to prescribe the social hierarchy. Yet the continual broadening of
the construction of infamia for both religious and systemic purposes may have
ultimately contributed to its decay. Many no longer upheld the expanding imperial
deﬁnition of dishonor—except when it suited their purposes.116
The traditional imposition of infamia rested on a collective notion of honor and
dishonor that did not survive into Late Antiquity. In regard to civic honors, Late
Antique “heretics” and Christians both certainly had their own internal system
of clerical oﬃces and titles that may have partially replaced the lure of public
yet costly civic honors provided by curial councils. Moreover, within heterodox
communities, whole populations were now considered legally infamis, but were
not viewed locally as such. This development complicated the prosecution of
heresy on a local level, and perhaps facilitated the use of infamia as a means
115. Cf. CJ. 1.3.30.6 (469); CJ 2.4.41 (395); CJ 1.16.1 (384).
116. See Harries’ assertion that “Laws which bore down hard on those who ﬂed their respon-
sibilities in guilds or councils, or which outlawed sacriﬁce or other forms of religious deviance, were
indeed a reﬂection of imperial policy, but their timing and addresses may be determined by local
factional conﬂicts” (1999: 214).
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of avoiding the curial duties stipulated by imperial mandate. Elite Romans were
concerned with status, which was part and parcel of the idea of shame: honor is
most valuable when it is scarce, and disrepute is a more eﬀective tactic when used
sparingly. In The World of Odysseus, Moses Finley wrote: “It is in the nature of
honour that it must be exclusive, or at least hierarchic. When everyone attains
equal honour, then there is no honour for anyone.”117 The same might be said for
dishonor. When it is kept focused and supported socially by the populace, legal
disrepute can be an eﬀective measure. In Late Antiquity, however, the status of
infamia became ambiguous, overused, manipulated, and, in many communities,
was no longer an eﬀective social policing technique. Constructions of honor
and dishonor were never monolithic concepts, but in the late empire, notions of
dishonor had become as fractured and uneven as the empire itself.
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